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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
HOME ELECTRIC CORPORATION,

a

rorporation,

Plaintif!-Respondent
vs.
GEORGE R. RUSSELL and MRS.
GEORGE R. RUSSELL, his wife,
Defedants-Respondents,
and
GEORGE R. RUSSELL and
RETTA 0. RUSSELL,
Third-Party PlaintiffsRespondents,
vs.
PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a California Corporation,

et al.

No. 10382

Third Party Defendants and
Appellant.

KENNETH E. SMITH COMPANY,
a corporation,

Plaintif!-Respondent,
vs.
GEORGE R. RUSSELL and MRS.
GEORGE R. RUSSELL, his wife
Defendants-Respondents,
and
GEORGE R. RUSSELL and
RETTA 0. RUSSELL,
Third Party PlaintiffsRespondents,
vs.
PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE
CmIPANY, a California corporation, et al.
Third Party Defendant and
Appellant.

No. 10383

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

8TA'l1 E.MENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
Thi• actions of Honw Electric Corporation and of
KPn11<>t '1 f'~. Smith ·Company wf're consolidated for trial
in tliP lowPr court, (RA 31), because the cases involved
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the same is~mPs and facts they are then•fore eonsolidat('d
in this brief on appeal. vVhilP ,judgment was Pl1!t·1·pd
against defendants George R. Russell and Retta O. Hn,
sell, each of whom had pleaded over under their third
party complaints and each of whom were awarded judgment over against appellant Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company and against Deseret Construction &
Investments, Inc., a corporation, this appeal is taken
by Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company only.
The actions were brought by Home Electric Cor.
poration in the one case, and by Kenneth E. Smith Company in the other case, as against defendants Russell to
recover the cost of materials furnished to Russells by
each of said plaintiffs in the construction of a home on
unimproved property belonging to Russells, Russells
having failed to require a bond for the protertion of
mechanic's and materialmen who furnished lahor and
materials to Russells. Russells financed the building
through a loan evidenced by a mortgage and note giwn
by them to appellant Pacific Mutual Life Insuranee
Company, the monies from which loan were advanePd
by the agent of Pacific l\Iutual Life Insurance Companr
to the general contractor as the building progressPd according to a written agreement made and enten·d into
by and between Russells and Pacific Mutual Lif1' fnsur
ance Company. Russells also entered into a written
contract for the construction of the building on tlwir
property with Deseret Construction & InvPstnwnb. lni·.
as general contractor.

3
Dl~PO~l'l'JON OF CARE MADE IN LO\VER COURT

Tl11• lmn--r court entered a judgment dated February
. , 1!Hi;) in th<-> case instituted by Home Electric Corporat i011 (No. 10382) in favor of plaintiff Home Electric
( '01 poration and agaim3t George R. Russell and Retta
(J. Hu:-;:-:(•11, his wifo, in thP sum of $347.42 with interest
th1·n·on at tlw ratP of 8'/r per annum, and in favor of
( !1·01',i!.•' H. Russell and Retta 0. Russell, his wife, on
1h1·ir third party emnvlaint, against Pacific Mutual Life
ln:-:man('t' Company, and Deseret Construction & Invest11wnt:-;, Inc., in th<-> same amount.
The lo\\'Pr court entered a judgment, dated Februan·
.... , 19()5 in the case instituted by Kenneth E.
:-lmith Company, (No. 10383) in favor of plaintiff, Ken-

11..th I•~. Rmith Company and against George R. Russell
and RPtta 0. Russell, his wife, in the sum of $945.06
11 it h intPrf'st thPrPon at the rate of 8% per annum, and
in favor of 0<->orge R. Russell and Retta 0. Russell, his
\l'ifr, on thf'ir third party complaint, against Pacific Mutual Lifr lnsurancP Company, and Deseret Construction
& lnY1•:-:tim•nts Inc., in the same amount.

IU~LlEF

SOUGHT ON APPEAL

AppPllant, Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company
~1·Pb

r·pwr:-:al of the judgments as the same affect this

appdlant.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants George R. Russell and Retta O. Russr!J
his wife, the owners of unimproved real property i~
Salt Lake County, Utah, a building lot described as. Lnl
511, Arcadia Heights Plat "E," did on January l7tJ 1
1961, enter into a construction agreement with Third
Party Defendant, Deseret Construction and InveHtlllf'llt>.
Inc., for the construction of a home on said propprtr,
at a stated cost, (R A 6). Russells did not requirP
Deseret Construction and Investments, Inc. to furnisJ 1
a performance bond as provided by Sec. 14-2-2 lJ:CA.
1953.
In order to finance the construction of a homf' on
their lot, Russells borrowed the sum of $17 ,000.00 frmu
Third Party Defendant, appellant, Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Company, executing and delivering a promissory note and mortgage on said property to secure sairl
sum. Prior to and to induce appellant to make sairl
loan, Russells executed and delivered to said loan company a construction agreement, which was made a part
of the mortgage by reference, which agreement is attached to and made a part of Russells' Third Part\
Complaint, (RA 9, 10). Under said agreement Russellf
agreed with Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company t"
diligently improve said property at a cost of not le8s
than $18,168.00 in accordance with plans and specifieations and general building contract (if any) approved
by Lender (Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company).
and to furnish Pacific Mutual Life Insurance CompanY
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1ritl1 n·e<•ipted bills for all work or materials furnished

improvements and to remit to said loaning
a~eney such other amounts as it may from time to time
1 ,.qui n· in addition to such loan funds to assure full
paynwnt for such improvements.
1

,,r

~ueh

Th<· said construction agreement further provided
that ''subject to all conditions herein provided, Lender
-hall dishun;e such loan funds and the amount of all
~nch remittances either to Owner or Order, or in Lend1·r\; sole discretion, from time to time, without liability
~11 to <lo or for so doing, to any architect, engineer,
(u11tractor, subcontractor, mechanic or materialman enµ:ag-ed in or furnishing any work or material for such
rniprowrnents or any part thereof, as follows: " (then
in typewritt<:~n figures and letters is set out five paragraphs designating the method of advances as the building progressed, the first four being unimportant to the
ease, thr fifth paragraph provides:) "$4000.00 (being
thr• last draw of the mortgage money) after house is complPtPd according to plans and specifications now on file
in LPnder's Office, yard has been graded, and all bills
for rnatPrial and labor have been paid." The other pro;·isions of said agreement herein referred to are printed
crnd further provide: "Lender in its sole discretion may
f rorn ti111P to time make any or all such disbursements
without the occurence of any or all conditions hereto
and upon default in performance of any obligation of
1Jwn<•r hPrein or in said loan application or secured by
,;iid mortgage or trust deed, may itself for its own
irnt<'rtion and without liability so to do or for so doing
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cause such improvements to be completed and any or
all such obligations to be performed and disburse such
loan funds and the amount of all such remittances or am
part thereof as above provided or in payment or satisfaction of any or all such obligations of Owner."
Appellant deposited said loan fund with Backman
Abstract & Title Company for disbursement. Not only
were these loan funds deposited with Backman Abstraet
& ·Title Company but Russells also deposited with said
title company the sum of $1663.00 for disbursement \rith
the loan funds (R B 14).
Defendants and respondents Russells went to thr
office of Backman Abstract & Title Co. and executed
the note and mortgage in favor of Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Company (R B 16), and LeGrand Backman
of the title company was told by Russells that the general
contractor on the job was Deseret Construction & Investments, Inc. (R B 17). Funds were thereafter issued
to the general contractor as follows: Mr. Tatro, tlw
general manager of said company would go to the office
of Backman Abstract & Title Company with vouchers
of checks issued to sub-contractors. Mr. Backman woulr1
then total the amount represented by these voucher'
and issue a check for the Russell account to Desrrt>t
Construction & Investments Inc., for said amount. Thi>
method was followed during the entire construction
period (R B 18). All of the funds were paid out from
the Russell account to Deseret Construction & Investments, Inc., the general contractor (R B 20). The titl~
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did not have a list of the sub-contractors, had
no know IedgP as to who they were and made no payment
1,\ a11:- suh-eontraetors, but all payments were made to
tlw gPll('J'<d eontraetor, Deseret Construction & Invest:1wnt~, lnr. ( R B 20).
(. 0111 pan:-·

Tilt- plaintiff, respondents, who were materialmen,
~11h-<·<mtraetors, were not fully paid by the general contrador. As a result these cases were filed by them
<tgninst dPft•ndants, respondents Russells, who filed
adion under their third party complaint and obtained
j111l!.!,'ltt<"nt ovPr against Deseret Construction & Invest1111·nts, Inc. and Pacific :Mutual Life Insurance Company,
tlj(' latt('l' being appellant herein.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE ACTION,
MADE AFTER THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS, RUSSELLS, RESTED, ON THE GROUND FROM THE
EVIDENCE AND FACTS AND LAW THIRD PARTY
PLAINTIFFS HAD SHOWN NO RIGHT TO RELIEF
AS AGAINST PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY.

Tlw uncontradicted evidence is that appellant's
apynt, upon completion of the construction, had paid to
D<'H·n·t ( ~onstruction & Investments, Inc., the general
<"mtrador, the monies deposited with said company (R
B 20, :w). Tlw construction agreement betwPen the Rus·i·l1:- a]l(l Paeific l\Iutual Life Insurance Co. was in evi,J. 11<· 1 •• frnrn whielt it is clParly Sl'en that it was essential
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that the funds provided under the mortgage would, under
the construction agreement, be employed exclusively in
the erection of the home on the property mortgaged,
since the security for the loan only came into existenn
as work progressed according to settlf'd plans and sp""
ifications. This is basic to construction financing and
is often emphasized where the role of construction lPnding is compared and contrasted with mortgage practic~.,
generally. In such cases, the loaning institution insisti
upon control over expenditures and payments to insun·
completion of the improvement because of the risks inherent in this form of lending. It is to insure that
sufficient funds are available to complete the improvement and the agreement gives the loaning agency th(
right to pay to the contractor or parties furnishing tlw
materials and labor or, at the option of the lender, to
the mortgagor to be applied by the latter for this purpose. The re ten ti on of funds by the lender together with
authority to make direct disbursements follow naturally
from recognition of the fact that completion of tlw
structure is of paramount importance in this type nf
security arrangement.
The authority given to appellant under the construction agreement is a device commonly required of the
mortgagor in such construction, as a means of protecting
the lender against claims of negligence or other im
propriety in the disbursement procedure; it does not
affect the lender's obligation to perform when the terllli
of the agreement have been met. This is the usual prncedure followed in construction loan financing. It i~
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~tah·rl, for

that

Pxample, in a study of mortgage practices

" ... progress payments for work in place may be
made to either the general contractor in a lwnp
:-:m11 or to each of the subcontractors, in the disc·rd ion of the mortgagee. The decision is based
on the lender's estimate of the financial and administrative responsibility of the general contractor and his ability to procure the necessary
waivers of lien and supporting affidavits from
tlH' subcontractors. (italics added)
An authorization from the owner to the mortgagee . . . to disburse the proceeds of the loan
in accordance with the contractor's statement is,
of course, a prerequisite to any disbursement."
PeasP and Kerwood Mortgage Banking 312 (2d
Pd. 1965)

The authorization contained in the Construction
AgwPment in the instant cases is a socalled "blanket"
authority to disburse. It has been noted that some
lPnrler:-: require the borrower to authorize individual
rfodmnw11wnts at all stages of construction. Conway
.\[ortgage Lf•nding 340 (1960). In any event the purpo:-:p i:-: e!Par. It is natural that the mortgagee should
c;(·ek Jmlt<)dion against the consequences of improper
<lislmrsP!llPnt:-:, in vie"\v of the complexity of factual
dPtf'rn1ination with which a construction mortgagee is
(·onfrontc·d whih• thP building is being erected. (Falls,
LumhPr Co. v. Hernan, 114 Ohio App. 262 (1961) ). Thus
thp authorization by its terms releases the mortgagee
frn1t1 liahili(v for errors of judgment in making disburse11H"l1l Ind 1wt for wilful misconduct.
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No wilful misconduct is shown in thet-·W casps on 1;,
part of the disbursing ag<'nt and none is chargC'd. '!'Ji,
evidence shows elearly that if a mistalrn was rnadt', whir·'
is not admitted, it was error of judguwnt in relyin~ 11 r
representations of the general contractor. It is evickn·
that the disbursing agent had, on other occasions ch,a1·
with the general contractor in the same manner on oth1·:
jobs (R B 17, 18), and these dealings with thf' genPrai
contractor were conducted in a satisfactory manner (RB

20, 21).

It has been said that the need for individual jud~
ment in making disbursements under construction mortgage financing is reflected in the agreement entered into
by the lender and borrower. An instance is Whiti1111M ead Co. v. West Coast Bond and Mortgage Co. 15;
P2d 629 (Cal. 1944) where the loan terms contained thii
language:
"The owner hereby authorizes the lender, at
any time at its option, either in its own or !bl'
owner's name to do any and all things necessary
or expedient in the opinion of the lender to secun·
the erection and completion of the improvementi
in accordance with the plans and specifications
... and to make or withhold payments for labor
and materials used in the construction, and to d1J
any and every act or thing appertaining to or
arising out of the construction or completion of
.
t s .... "
t h e 1mprovemen
The parties to a contract are free to define its term~
In the instant cases we have a contract in which thi
borrowers agre(' to improve unimproved property owni·ii
1

11

\,\ 1l1PJll at a c·ost of 11ot less than $18,lGS.OO. They
;1:.~n·<·d to furnish to LPnder recPiptP<l bills for all work
11 r rnat1>riaJ:.; l\nnished for such improvements and to
,., 111if In f,('J/(ler such other amounts as it may from time
/11 ti111!' require in addition to such loa11 funds to assure
1111! 1111y111c11t for such impr01;ements. Not only this but
tlw horro\n'rs authorized the Lender to disburse such
Joan funds and the amount of all such remittances either
to tlw 01l'llcr or order or in Lender's sole discretion,
l'rn111 ti11w to time, without liability so to do or for so
dinir, to :my architect, engineer, contractor, subcontractor, Jll<'<'hanie or materialman engaged in or furnishing
an>· work or material for such improvements or any
part thPn"'of. Tlwn the parties specified the manner
un<ln whi<·h advancements may be made and further
a~rPP<l that tlw Lender in its sole discretion may from
tillH· to time mak<> any or all such disbursements without
ilil' ocrnn,11ce of any or all conditions thereto.

As hPretofore stated, even with such provisions cont ai1wcl i11 the agreement between the borrowers and the
Ji.11dPr, it is concech~d that the lender would not be ex1·11~Pd from wilful misconduct. But it is contended that
tl1P l<>rnlPr is not liable for errors of judgment and the
l1·1HlPr is Psp0cially not liable under the facts of the
in~tant <'asps where the general contractor represented
tn thP lendt>r's disbun;ing agent, that the claims repre~1·ntrcl by thP vouchers produced to the disbursing agent
\I Pre· all of tlw outstanding claims and that they would
Ii:· full~· satisfi<>d out of the final draw.
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For the trial court to find against apprllant it ''"
necessary that the evidence show wilful misconduct 01
the part of the disbursing agent. This was neith,
pleaded nor was any suggestion of such made durin
the trial of the case.
The borrows failed to comply with the terms of th
Construction Agreement if receipted bills for material
were not furnished to the Lender. If the building ro,
more than the contract price, as the general contractor
testified, then the borrowers not the Lender as the tria
court has adjudged, are obligated under the terms 111
their agreement to furnish such addition funds as are
required to fully pay for the building.

1

While no claim is made that the Construction AgrPt
ment is not intended to protect the borrower, the real
purpose in the Lender's requirement that such an agree.
ment be executed is because it becomes an essential parr
of the security arrangement providing the only mean.'
of assuring that ample funds will be available to eom
plete the construction.
As was held by this Honorable Court in thr W'
of Utah Savings & Loan v. Mecham, 12 U. 2d 335, 366P
2d 598, when the premises are improved the mortgage'
became bound by virtue of its agreement to advanc1
the specific sums to pay therefor.
Bv its decision in this case the trial court entird1
ignore.cl the provisions of the written agreement k
tween the borrowers and the lenders and frustrated tlw
intention of the parties to the agreement;
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Corbin on Contracts says:
"l f the parties have concluded a transaction
to which is appears that they intend to make a
contract, the court should not frustrate their intPntion if it is possible to reach a fair and just
rPsult, even though this requires a choice among
conflicting meanings and the filling of some gaps
that the parties have left." (Corbin, Contracts
Sec.%)
The dc·cision of the Lender's agent, in advancing the

111ortgage monies under the circumstances of this case
\ms reasonable. He exercised the discretionary power
given him nndPr the contract in paying the monies over
to the general contractor. There was no obligation on
his part to determine who the sub-contractors were or
whetlwr they were paid. That was the responsibility of
thr genPral eontractor who was hired by third party
plaintiffs. 'rhe Lender followed the accepted practice
in ::;ueh cast>s in paying the monies to the general contrndor, when the work was completed.
'l11w derision from which this appeal is taken is not

accord with the recognized rule of contract interpretation. ''Whenever possible a contract should be so con:-;trnrd that there are mutually binding promises on each
varty." Ross V. Producers Mut. Ins. Co. 4 U2d 396, 295
P. 2d ~3D. And, perhaps most important, in determining
lioth the ''meaning and the legal effect of an agreement,
the transaction should be considered as a whole." Corbin,
Contracts, Sec. 549. This of course requires considera1 i!on of the "nature of the business at hand, the purpose
m

14
of tlw parti<·s to th0 tram;;action, and otlH·r r0h·wn1
'·
cnmstanePs." Corbin, Contract:-:, S<'c. !);)(),
••
1

It is Pvid<>nt in tlw instant ('asps that tlu• \\'ork
thP construction of tlw irnprov<'lll<'nts on hon 011·p:'
propPrty had hP<'n cornpld<>d as was n•prPs<'nt<>ct 1o a·I
pellant's ag-Pnt h>- th<• g<•1wral <'ontractor. ThPrl'f 1,i
thP ap1wllant was ohligat<>d to a<lvanee th<' monirs ]i1·
by it to PH>' for tlw sanw. S<•<• l'tah 8arj11,qs <C Lr111 11
Jlfrclrn m, 1 :Z l ~. 2d 338, 36fi P. 2d 598. This appt>llant di1:
Tlw fact that th<'n' W<'r<' not snffiei<>nt moniPs in ti
a<'<'onnt to pa>- tlw sub-contractors in full was no faui'
of appPllant. Y Pt th0 trial court held that becarnw a11
pPllant's agPnt did not s0e to the application of t)1.
moni<'s beyond the gPnf'ral contractor, appellant is liahl
for th0 shortage in funds. That is the effeet of th,
d(•cision in tlwse cases. Had appellant's agent advancr·1i
the moniPs before th0 work and materials required fr,·
thP completion of the building were furnished, then ap
pdlant might be liable to the borrower in that casr tlwr·
being no obligation on the part of appellant to adYaJ!t
the funds. However, as heretofore stated, th<' evidew
is to the effect that the construction of the irnprowmH
was complete when the final draw was made b~· tlw i!'"r
eral contractor. (R B 30).
1

There is no evidence in these cases to support tl1·
Court's finding against appellant. There is not a scintill:
of evid0n<'e that anv of the monies held by appellant'~
a<rpnt "·ent elsewhe~·e than into the construction. Sud·
h
'
is not even contend<>d h~- respondents. Respondent·
onl>· <'OntPntion is that appellant's agent was ohlig-at"'

15
tu

H'('

1hat all suh-<'ontractors were paid, wlwther or not

tli1 r<· was suffi<'iPnt money in the account.

The trial
,·1111rt t>nti n•I>' if.,rnored the obligations of the borrowers
:1nd1·1 tli<· <'onstnwtion agTt-f•rnent and applied one sen: .. 11cl' tlwn·in against appellant, when it was evident
i'11)Jll the g(•nPral contractor's tPstimony in the record
tli:1t in ordt>r to pay for the construction of tht- improve11wnts it was rn•cessary for the general contractor to
draw th(· monit-s on deposit for such purpose (R B 30).
Thi· whole of thP C'ontract must be considered, one para~rnp}1 ('amiot be pickt-d out and applied without the
(·onsidL•ration of the whole contract. ~rhis is a cardinal
rull' in thP construction of contracts.
In l 7A CJS 8ec. 297 at page 112 it is stated:
''The intention, or purpose, of the parties to
a contract is to be collected, ascertained, or gathPred from the entire instrument, or the instrument
as a whole, and not from detached or isolated
portions, or provisions, or fragmentary parts,
and it is necessary to consider all of its parts
or provisions in order to determine the meaning
of an>' particular part."
Tlw Ptah ('OUrts follo\'.red this rule in General Mills,
f
c. ( 'ra.q1111, 1:~+ P2d 1089 and in Vitagraph, Inc. v .
.l111rrican Theatre Co., 77 U. 71, 291 P. 303.
11 1 •.

Dishnnw111t>nt proet>durt> is s<'t out in paragraph 3
,,f the ennstrnction agre<>ment. It provides for payments
>rding to progrPss of construction in the amounts set
! '·l'l Ii tl11•rpin and confers upon the mortgagee the option
· 1 1 :lit~ ing pay111Pnts either to the mortgagor (owner)
""

1
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or order, or to contractors, materialmen. sub-contract,.
or mechanics or any of them without liability so to,:
or for so doing. This simply prPscribes the mann.
in which performance undPr one of the alternativP~ rir"
to the mortgagee would be undertaken. The disbur~.
ment clause and the authorization provision therPin a:
not inconsistent and gi\e the mortgagee an option as·
mode of performance. This contract gave the mort~ag,.
the right to ad\ance funds as construction progrw~
in accordance with settled plans and specifications: ti·
obligation could be discharged by payment to the Ow1w
or, at the option of the mortgagee, directly to the Cl''.
tractor, or subcontractors: if the method of payrner·
to the contractor were adopted. the mortgagee pomss~~
authority to make payments directly to this dPsi~nat·.
contractor and reserved the right to exercise discretiN
in making particular payouts.
The obligation of the mortgagee to disburse fund·
is contingent upon adequate perfonnance warrantin:
such disbursement. This concept is basic to construrti,,:
financing and has recei\ed acknowledgment in a nurnl•
of decisions. In Boise Payettr Lumber Co. r. Tri1wi:r
~76 Pac. 971. for example. it is sai<l:
"The mortgagee's obligation was to adrnnr
the balance of the funds represented by the mn.r~
gage note upon compliance by the mortgagor mt
the conditions of the agreement. \iz .. the impr 01 •
ment of the premises."
And when performance has been satisfactory. the obli~::
tion of the mortgagee is fixed:
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''The }Jremises were improved and the mortgagee b(•came bound by virtue of the construction
agrPPlJl(•nt to advance the specific sums to pay
therefor."

That i~ to say, the obligation to disburse is con' lllg<'llt upon adt•quate performance. Performance was
ad!'qnatP in the instant case and the general contractor
"a.' f'ntitle<l to receive the monies which were promised
to lw pai<l to him upon such performance.
TlwrP is no evidence in these cases to show that the
111oni<'s paid out by appellant's agent to the general
cimtraetor di<l not go into the construction of the home
of third party plaintiff, Russells. On the contrary, the
.,yidi•nce shows that all monies did go into the improve11wnts.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO FIND THAT DESERET CONSTRUCTION & INVESTl\IENTS, INC. WAS ACTING AS
AGENT FOR THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS, RUSSELLS. AT ALL Til\IES AND PARTICULARLY IN
RECEIVING THE MORTGAGE MONIES FROM APPELLANT'S AGENT AND IN FAILING AND REFTSING TO INVOKE ESTOPPEL AGAINST THIRD
PARTY PLAINTIFFS AND IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT.

Third party plaintiffs Russells in their answer and
Third-Party Complaint in each case pleaded under their
Fir"t Cause of Action as follows:
1. That on or about the 17th day of January,
19Gl, the defendants George R. Russell and
Hetta 0. Russell, his wife, entered into a con-
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struction agreement with the third-party d,
fendant, Deseret Construction and r~w,·
ments, Inc., wherein third-party def<'ndai
agreed to construct a home on the fo]] 011 1l
described property, to-wit:
Lot 511, Arcadia Heights Plat ''1<~ " aeenr
'
':
to the official plat thereof,
which property was and is now owned by t1.
defendants Russell.
2. That the defendants Russell have fullv pa:.
said third-party defendant, Deseret Co~strur·
tion and Investments, Inc., for the constru1·
tion of said home, but said third-part>· d,
f endant has failed to pay the obligation~ ir
connection with said construction, . includim
the alleged obligation of (here is set out tll'
party plaintiff and the amount claimed in ead
case).
Third party plaintiffs plead that they have ful!\
paid the general contractor.
It is not claimed by third party plaintiffs that D,.,
eret Construction & InvestnH'nt::-; was not authorized h•
them to draw the monies on dt>posit with appellan(
agent to pay for the construction of the irnprovrlll('Jil'
The evidenr0 is to the effrct that third party plai11!il1·
authorized and expected Deseret Construction & lnvl'~'
rnents, Inr. to drm,· the monies as the building 11rr
gressed. This it did as general contractor.
It would appear from these facts that it is elenwn
tary that Deseret Construction & Investnwnts, Inc. act,,,:
at all times as agent for third party plaintiffs contral'I
ing with sub-contractors and materiahnen and in dra 11111 ·
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tlw funds to pay for same. [t is evident that third
part:: plaintiffs knew at all times that Deseret Constructw11 & I 11vt>st1rn~nts, Inc. was drawing on said funds.
Then· was no rneam; of paying the contractor other than
to dra\\ on said funds. The court should have invoked
.. ~toprwl in thir<llparty plaintiff's action against appellant. For the eourt to find against appellant as it did
:,, to find that third-party plaintiffs may recover from
:1ppt>llant rnoni('s paid on deposit by appellant to thirdparty plaintiffs.
,, 11

In ;3 A111 ..J ur.2d Agency Sec. 20 the law is stated:
'·rrhe question of whether an agency has been
<"!'Pated is ordinarily a question of fact which may
lw Pstahlished the same as any other fact, either
hy dirPct or by circumstantial evidence; and
whdhPr an agency has in fact been created is to
he dt•tennined by the relations of the parties as
they exist under the agreements or acts, with
thr qlwstion being ultimately one of intention ....
and if relations exist which will constitute an
agt>ney, it will be an agency whether the parties
1md<'rstood the exact natun.• of the relation or
not. Moreover, the manner in which the parties
d1,signatP tht• relationship is not controlling, and
if an ad done by one person in behalf of anothPr is in its essential nature one of agency,
tl1e one is the agent of such other notwithstanding
liP is not so called."

.\ppPllant's agPnt relied on the repn'sentativPs made
J,, thiJ'(l-part~· plaintiffs' agent; if the rPpn,sPntations
ii " 1(· fals1>, third-party plaintiffs cannot look to appPl:,, ,,t to rl·eowr for the fraud of third-party plaintiffs'
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EvPn if it appParPd that third-party plainti!·
agent, Deseret Construction & Investments, Inc., ilr.
said monies and did not apply the sa11w toward paymi·r
of materialmen, which the evidence does not rrfl, . .
third-party plaintiffs, having placed their agt>nt in 111 ,,
tion to commit a fraud on appellant, must suffer,: .
appellant. SeP Eanwe ·i:. Big Bear Land & Watrr 1
(Cal. 220 P2d 408, -! of syllabus, 2 CJS Agenc~', SPr. ]Ii"
pages 1270 et. seq.)
In 3 CJS Agency at page 187 the law is statrd a·
follows:
1

"The principal is liable although the agent,
negligence causing the tort occurs while the agen:
is deviating from the method in which he ha
been directed to perform the principal's businf's~ ·
In Martin v. Leatham, (Cal.) 71 P2d 336, it is ~a1·
in citing the case of Johnson v. Monson, 183 Cal. rn.
190 P. 635, wherein the court quotes from Otis Elcratu•
Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 163 Cal. 31, 39, 124 P. iO+.;
L.R.A. (NS) 529, as follows:

"It is the general doctrine of the law, as it ·
our statutory rule, that a principal is liahl'.· ;
third parties not only for the nPgligenct> o.t 1"
agent in the transaction of the busine:;s ot ti.
agency, but likewise for the frauds, torts. or otht.
wrongful acts committed by such age?t m a~il d'.
a part of the transaction of such busmess, c1 ~.ill·
Story on Agency, Sec. 452, Sherman & Rk'dtii·i·:
on Negligence, Sec. 65.
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In [)1,Mirjiau r. Ideal Heating Corp. (Cal.) 2-!G P2d
.-JI. it is said:

''Unless required by law to employ a particular
awlnt, a principal is responsible to third persons
for n<'gligence of his agent in transaction of bnsin<>ss of agency, including wrongful acts committed
hv f'Uf'h agent as part of transaction of such bnsin~ss, and for his wilful omission to fulfill the
obligations of the principal."
lu r1111ghn '/). Board of Police Com'rs. (Cal.) 140
l'~d 130 it is held. A principal is liable for torts of his
ag(•11t co111111ittPd within scope of his authority under
dudrirn• of 'rPspondt>nt superior.'
POINT III.
TH~

COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND RE-

FUSING TO ADOPT THE PROPOSED FINDINGS

OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDG1\fENT SUBMITTED BY APPELLANT.

There was no Pvidt>nce introduced in the case to supp111 t the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judg111/'nt suhmittrd by third-party plaintiffs and adopted by
tJH· court. There ~was evidence supporting the Findings
11f Fad, Condusiom; of Law and Judgment submitted by
aPT'(·lla n t.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-

LANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

TherP lwing no evidence before the court to support
th(' Findings of 1'-.act, Conclusions of Law and Judgment,
1lH· 1·onrt should have granted a new trial.
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CON"CLlif-ilON
Third-Part~' Plaintiff/.; having h~' th1:1ir writtrn agrPr

ment authorized app<>llant to pay rnoniPs lwl<l hy it tn
the gen<>ral contractor for tlH' construction of improw
nwnts on prop<>rty of third-party plaintiffs, an<l the con.
struction having h0en completed requiring tlw drawin~
do\vn of all moniPs on deposit for said purposes, thi
judgmPnt of tlw lower court should h0 rewrsed and thP
actions as against app01lant should lw dismissPd.
Respectfully submitted,
Backman, Backman & Clarl
1111 Deseret Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah,
Attorneys for nppdlanl.

